The Intel

As we saw in his first term, Trump approaches foreign policy from a transactional perspective. International organisations, partnerships, even long-held alliances – all are viewed through the lens of US national interest and give and take. This will complicate development efforts in his second term, but it need not completely undercut them.  

Although development has altruistic underpinnings, it is also used as a tool of national power – and in pursuit of national objectives. Take for example the Pacific Islands region, which spans from the Philippines to Hawaii. Prompted by growing Chinese ambitions across the Pacific, the US has drastically ramped up development efforts over the past several years to maintain influence and presence in this critical region. This effort started under Trump 1.0, and has widespread bi-partisan support, with even the conservative think tank the Heritage Foundation publishing a report calling for continued resourcing to what it asserts is vital to US national interest.  

And yet even in areas deemed high national security interest, development efforts will be complicated by two other defining characteristics of a Trump Presidency: a rejection of climate change and a resistance to playing well with others.

The removal of climate change from the lexicon of the US government will complicate development efforts tied in any way to the effects of climate change. For the Pacific Islands, where climate change is truly an existential threat for most of these low-lying and natural disaster-prone islands, many development efforts are aimed at climate-related projects such as financing resilient infrastructure and hardening disaster preparedness. Continued resourcing under a Trump administration will likely depend on the Pacific’s ability to frame these needs in a non-climate way, such as focusing on the critical infrastructure aspect of roads, airports, and communications networks.

When Biden assumed the presidency in 2021, he quickly moved to re-invigorate partnerships and alliances around the globe, with particular focus on enhancing partnership networks across the Indo-Pacific. Many of these, like the Quad, have focused on delivering critical capacity such as maritime domain awareness and health programming to the region. How and if some of these groupings might change under Trump is unclear, but more impetus will be on partners and allies to make the case for why working together on development efforts in regions like the Pacific is directly tied to US national security interests.

To the extent that Donald Trump knows anything about foreign aid, he dislikes it. The whole concept runs directly counter to his nativist and unilateralist brand of authoritarian populism. But except in cases where it might get his attention as part of a specific foreign policy transaction, he will mostly leave its day-to-day management to his subordinates.  

While Trump has tried to publicly disavow the controversial “Project 2025” manifesto, many of these subordinates, including incoming Vice President J.D. Vance, are closely associated with it. The document offers a radically reshaped vision of America’s place in the global order and the role of development assistance in supporting it. It proposes a US withdrawal from international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank (whilst, confusingly, arguing for their reform), as well as key global health bodies like the WHO and UNFPA.

Global development issues like advancing women’s empowerment and addressing climate change, including US participation in the 2015 Paris Agreement, are characterised as the priorities of a “woke global elite” that would be scrapped. The manifesto also envisions a new, potentially stricter version of the “global gag rule” on America’s aid partners, further empowering national and transnational movements seeking the rollback of reproductive and sexual health and rights.

In thinking about whether this kind of agenda and the deep funding cuts associated with it will be pursued, the disposition of the next Congress will be a key variable. Perhaps the best that can be hoped for is a legislative stalemate if the incoming Trump administration decides to focus any serious attention on aid.

Nonetheless, Trump can still do a lot of damage without Congress and his victory will prove awkward for an Australian government that says it will put more focus on gender equality and climate change. Given our neighbours’ concerns with the existential threat posed by latter, the election result will undermine US attempts to strengthen its relationships in the Pacific and to counter China’s regional influence.

While much of what might follow over the next four years is too unpredictable to plan for, Australia and its like-minded partners should work together to prioritise and adequately fund those elements of the global development, climate and human rights architecture that they think are worth protecting from Trump 2.0.

Australians are obsessed by the US election. We follow every twist and turn with the avid attention of a fan in grand final season. For the rest of the world, perhaps it's not as consequential as we think.

The majority world of developing countries is just trying to get by. Families need jobs, kids need to go to school, leaders need to manage crises – often made worse by climate change – and secure their legitimacy by meeting the demands of their people. Above all, majority world leaders need to be able to show some modest gains on development indicators. The reality is that life and lives in developing countries will continue to be hard, no matter the result of a US election. The cynical might even query if the US really cares about development in other countries anyway? It’s fair to think Trump will probably have bigger concerns.

That's not to say that there won't be effects from the election result. A Trump Presidency could be expected to rollback aid and cease it entirely in contested areas such as reproductive rights. So there are issues at stake.

But we should be cautious about assuming that the majority world cares about the same problems that occupy us. If Australia wants to be a real partner to the countries around us, we need to understand the world from their point of view. In which case, we might be paying as much attention to global battles on climate finance or the expansion of BRICS as we do to the US election.